- 1		
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	LAW OFFICES OF DALE K. GALIPO Dale K. Galipo (SBN 144074) dalekgalipo@yahoo.com Cooper Alison-Mayne (SBN 343169) cmayne@galipolaw.com 21800 Burbank Boulevard, Suite 310 Woodland Hills, CA 91367 Phone: (818) 347-3333 Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
9	CENTRAL DISTRIC	CT OF CALIFORNIA
10		
11	URSULA BYRAM, S.B. by and	Case No. 2:23-cv-09285-KS
12	through guardian ad litem TIMOTHY BYRAM, N.B. by and through guardian	[Hon. Karen L. Stevenson]
13	ad litem TIMOTHY BYRAM, and A.B.	[PROPOSED] FINAL PRETRIAL
14	by and through guardian ad litem	CONFERENCE ORDER
15	KAITLYN HUMENCHUK, individually and as successors-in-	Pre-Trial Conference
16	interest to Everett Byram,	January 21, 2025, 10:00 a.m.
17	Plaintiffs,	<u>Trial</u>
18	Tiamvillo,	February 10, 2025, 8:30 a.m.
19	V.	
20	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,	
$_{21}$	BLAKE RUNGE, and BRENDA	
22	ALCANTARA,	
23	Defendants.	
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		1
		-]-

[PROPOSED] FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS				
2	1.	THE	PARTIES A	RE:	5
3	2.	FEDI THE	ERAL JURIS FOLLOWIN	DICTION AND VENUE ARE INVOKED UPON G GROUNDS:	5
4	3.	TRIA	L ESTIMAT	TE:	6
5	4.	THE	TRIAL IS T	O BE A JURY TRIAL	6
6 7	5.	THE PRO	FOLLOWIN	IG FACTS ARE ADMITTED AND REQUIRE NO	6
8	6.	THE WITH	FOLLOWIN Hout Prej	G FACTS, THOUGH STIPULATED, SHALL BE UDICE TO ANY EVIDENTIARY OBJECTION:	6
9	7.	THE	PARTIES C	LAIMS AND DEFENSES.	6
10		Plain	tiffs' Claims:		7
11 12		(a)	Plaintiffs pl following d	an to pursue the following claims against the efendants:	7
13			Claim 1: Amer	Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth ndment)	7
14 15			Claim 2: Relat Amer	Substantive Due Process, Interference with Familial ions (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth adment)	7
16 17			Claim 3: Fourt	Unlawful Detention (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the h Amendment)	7
18			Claim 4: Unco	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability Claim – nstitutional Custom or Policy	8
19 20			Claim 5: Failu	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability Claim – re to Train	8
21			Claim 6:	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability Claim –	Q
22					0
23			Claim 7: 12132	Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 2)	9
24			Claim 8:	Battery (Wrongful Death and Survival)	10
25			Claim 9:	Negligence (Wrongful Death and Survival)	10
26			Claim 10:	False Imprisonment	11
27			Claim 11:	Violation of the Bane Act (Cal. Civil Code § 52.1)	11
28					

1		(b)	The elemen	ts required to establish Plaintiffs' claims are:	11
$\begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix}$		()	Claim 1:	Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth adment)	
4			Claim 2:		
6 7			Claim 3: Fourt	Unlawful Detention (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the h Amendment)	12
8			Unco	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability Claim – nstitutional Custom or Policy	
10 11				42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability Claim – ication	
12 13			Claim 7: 1213	Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 2)	15
14			Claim 8:	Battery (Wrongful Death and Survival)	15
15			Claim 9:	Negligence (Wrongful Death and Survival)	16
16			Claim 10:	False Imprisonment	16
17			Claim 11:	Violation of the Bane Act (Cal. Civil Code § 52.1)	16
18		AFFI	RMATIVE	DEFENSES	17
19		1. De:	fendants Plan	n To Pursue the Following Affirmitive Defenses	17
20	,	2. The	e Elements R	Lequired to Establish Defendants' affirmitive Defenses	17
21	3	3. The	e Key Evider	ace Defendants Rely on for each Affirmitive Defense	17
22				SUES:	
23					
24				8:	
25				Y IS COMPLETE	20
26	10.	ALL I BEEN		RES PURSUANT TO F. R. CIV. P 26(A)(3) HAVE	20
27 28	11.		JOINT WIT D WITH TH	NESS LISTS OF THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN E COURT:	20
20			ſPr	OPOSED] FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER	
- 1	1		L- 1.		

1	12.	LAW AND MOTION:	20
2	13.	THE COURT HAS NOT ORDERED BIFURCATION OF ANY ISSUES AT THIS TIME.	21
3	14.	CONCLUSION,	21
4	IT IS	SO ORDERED.	21
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17 18			
19			
20			
20			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
$\begin{bmatrix} 27 \\ 28 \end{bmatrix}$			
		$\it \Delta$	
		4 [Proposed] Final Pretrial Conference Order	

Following pretrial proceedings, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 16, and L.R. 16, 1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 3 This order may be modified as necessary pursuant to this Court's pending rulings on the parties' various motions in limine. 4 5 6 1. **THE PARTIES ARE:** Plaintiffs: 7 Ursula Byram 8 S.B., through guardian ad litem Timothy Byram 9 N.B., through guardian ad litem Timothy Byram 10 A.B., through guardian ad litem Kaitlyn Humenchuk 11 **Defendants**: 12 County of Los Angeles 13 Blake Runge Brenda Alcantara 14 15 16 Each of these parties has been served and has appeared. All other parties named in the pleadings and not identified in the preceding paragraph are now 17 18 dismissed. 19 The pleadings which raise the issues are: Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed March 29, 2024 (ECF No. 50); Defendants County of Los Angeles 20 21 and Blake Runge's Answer filed April 12, 2024 (ECF No. 61); Defendant Brenda Alcantara's Answer filed May 14, 2024 (ECF No. 65); the parties respective 22 Memorandums of Contentions of Fact and Law (ECF Nos. 73, 76); and this

[Proposed] Final Pretrial Conference Order.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE ARE INVOKED UPON 2. THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

27

23

24

25

26

Subject-matter jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a), and 1367 and venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The facts requisite to federal jurisdiction are admitted.

3. TRIAL ESTIMATE:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The parties estimate 5–7 court days for this trial.

4. THE TRIAL IS TO BE A JURY TRIAL

The trial is to be a jury trial.

The parties have been and will continue to file pretrial documents according to this Court's Scheduling Order regarding proposed jury instructions, proposed special verdict forms, and proposed *voir dire*.

5. THE FOLLOWING FACTS ARE ADMITTED AND REQUIRE NO PROOF:

- 1. This incident occurred on February 10, 2023, at approximately 10:30 p.m. at 37539 Oxford Drive, City of Palmdale, County of Los Angeles, State of California.
- 2. Defendant Blake Runge was acting within the course and scope of his employment as a Deputy Sheriff of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.
 - 3. Defendant Blake Runge was acting under color of law.
- 4. Defendant Brenda Alcantara was acting within the course and scope of her employment as a Deputy Sheriff of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's.
 - 5. Defendant Brenda Alcantara was acting under color of law.

6. THE FOLLOWING FACTS, THOUGH STIPULATED, SHALL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY EVIDENTIARY OBJECTION:

The parties do not stipulate to any facts beyond those listed in the above "Admitted Facts" in Section 5 above.

7. THE PARTIES CLAIMS AND DEFENSES.

Plaintiffs' Claims:

(a) Plaintiffs plan to pursue the following claims against the following defendants:

<u>Claim 1</u>: EXCESSIVE FORCE (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment)

Claim 1 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendant Blake Runge. Plaintiffs contend that Blake Runge used excessive force against Everett Byram ("Mr. Byram"), which resulted in Mr. Byram's injuries and death. Plaintiffs bring this claim as Mr. Byram's successors in interest and seek survival damages for Mr. Byram's pre-death pain and suffering, loss of life, and loss of enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages and attorneys' fees on this claim.

Claim 2: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILIAL RELATIONS (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment)

Claim 2 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendant Blake Runge. Plaintiffs contend that Blake Runge used excessive force against Mr. Byram in a manner that shocks the conscience, which resulted in Mr. Byram's death and interfered with the Plaintiffs' familial relationship with their husband and father, Mr. Byram. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and seek wrongful death damages on this claim. Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages and attorneys' fees on this claim.

Claim 3: UNLAWFUL DETENTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment)

Claim 3 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendant Brenda Alcantara. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Brenda Alcantara unlawfully detained Plaintiff Ursula Byram ("Mrs. Byram") for a period exceeding four hours without justification, which resulted in Mrs. Byram suffering emotional distress. Mrs. Byram brings this claim individually and seeks compensatory damages, including pain and

suffering, emotional distress, and humiliation. Mrs. Byram also seeks attorney's fees under this claim.

Claim 4: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM – **Unconstitutional Custom or Policy**

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Claim 4 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendant County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant County of Los Angeles maintained an unconstitutional custom or policy with respect to the use of deadly force, and this unconstitutional custom or policy played a substantial part in causing Mr. Byram's death and Plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and as successors in interest to Mr. Byram and seek wrongful death and survival damages on this claim. Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages and attorney's fees on this claim.

Claim 5: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM – Failure to **Train**

Claim 5 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendant County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant County of Los Angeles failed to train Defendant Blake Runge with respect to the use of deadly force, and this failure to train played a substantial part in causing Mr. Byram's death and Plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and as successors in interest to Mr. Byram and seek wrongful death and survival damages on this claim. Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages and attorneys' fees on this claim.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM – Ratification Claim 6:

Claim 6 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendant County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant County of Los Angeles has a history of ratifying unconstitutional and unreasonable uses of force, including deadly force, and ratified Defendant Blake Runge's unreasonable use of lethal force against Mr. Byram, and the bases for the shooting. Defendant County of Los Angeles is therefore liable to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and as successors in interest to Mr.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Byram and seek wrongful death and survival damages on this claim. Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages and attorneys' fees on this claim.

Claim 7: AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (42 U.S.C. § 12132)

Claim 7 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendant County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Byram was a "qualified individual" with a mental impairment that substantially limited his ability to care of himself and control his mental health. Under the ADA, Defendant County of Los Angeles is mandated to develop effective procedures for interactions with individuals with mental disabilities and to ensure the protection of their personal and civil rights. The County failed to properly train its deputies to respond and interact peacefully with individuals with mental health impairments suffering from mental health crises, such as Mr. Byram. Blake Runge failed to follow procedures for de-escalation, including waiting for a trained mental health crisis team to arrive on scene to assist Mr. Byram, who was experiencing a mental health crisis. See Sheehan v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1233 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the ADA "applies broadly to police 'services, programs, or activities" and recognizing claims for "(1) wrongful arrest, where police wrongly arrest someone with a disability because they misperceive the effects of that disability as criminal activity; and (2) reasonable accommodation, where, although police properly investigate and arrest a person with a disability for a crime unrelated to that disability, they fail to reasonably accommodate the person's disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees." (internal citations omitted).

As a result of the acts and omissions of Deputy Runge and the County, Mr. Byram suffered damages, including loss of life and pain and suffering. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and as successors in interest to Mr. Byram and seek wrongful death and survival damages on this claim. Plaintiffs also seek attorneys' fees and costs under this claim.

Claim 8: BATTERY (Wrongful Death and Survival)

Claim 8 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants Blake Runge and the County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs contend that Blake Runge's use of unreasonable force against Mr. Byram violated Mr. Byram's rights. Plaintiffs contend that the County of Los Angeles is vicariously liable for Runge's conduct pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a) ("A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative."). Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and as Mr. Byram's successors in interest and seek wrongful death and survival damages on this claim, including pre-death pain and suffering, loss of life, and loss of enjoyment of life. See Senate Bill 447, Civil actions: decedent's cause of action (2021-2022). Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages on this claim.

Claim 9: NEGLIGENCE (Wrongful Death and Survival)

Claim 9 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants Blake Runge and the County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs contend that Blake Runge's negligent use of force against Mr. Byram, including Runge's pre-shooting negligent tactics, violated Mr. Byrams rights. *Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 639 (2013) (pre-shooting tactics "are relevant considerations under California law in determining whether the use of deadly force gives rise to negligence liability). The County is vicariously liable for Runge's conduct pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a) ("A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative."). Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and as Mr. Byram's successors in interest and seek wrongful death and

survival damages on this claim, including pre-death pain and suffering, loss of life, and loss of enjoyment of life. See Senate Bill 447, Civil actions: decedent's cause of action (2021-2022).

Claim 10: FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Claim 10 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants Brenda Alcantara and the County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs contend that Brenda Alcantara's unlawful detention of Ursula Byram violated her rights. The County is vicariously liable for Alcantara's conduct pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a) ("A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative."). Mrs. Byram brings this claim and seeks damages for emotional distress and mental anguish.

Claim 11: VIOLATION OF THE BANE ACT (Cal. Civil Code §52.1)

Claim 11 is brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants Blake Runge and the County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Runge acted with reckless disregard for Mr. Byram's rights under Cal. Civil Code § 52.1 when he shot him. Plaintiffs bring this claim as Mr. Byram's successors in interest and seek survival damages for Mr. Byram's pain and suffering, loss of life, and loss of enjoyment of life on this claim. Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages and a multiplier pursuant to Cal. Civil Code § 52 et seq.

(b) The elements required to establish Plaintiffs' claims are:

Claim 1: EXCESSIVE FORCE (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment)

Elements:

- 1. Blake Runge acted under color of law;
- 2. Blake Runge used excessive force against Mr. Byram; and

See Wilkinson v. Torres, 601 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010); Porter v. Osborne, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008).

Claim 3: UNLAWFUL DETENTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment)

Elements:

- 1. Brenda Alcantara seized Ursula Byram's person;
- 2. In seizing Ursula Byram's person, Brendan Alcantara acted intentionally; and
- 3. The seizure was unreasonable.
- 26 See Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions, No. 9.20 Particular rights—
- 27 | Fourth Amendment—Unreasonable Seizure of Person—Generally (2017) (revised
- 28 | March 2021).

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Claim 4:

42 U.S.C. § 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM –

Unconstitutional Custom or Policy

Elements:

- 1. Blake Runge acted under color of law;
- 2. The acts of Blake Runge deprived Mr. Byram of his constitutional right to be free from excessive force;
- Blake Runge acted pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy or a widespread longstanding practice or custom of the defendant County of Los Angeles; and
- 4. The defendant County of Los Angeles' official policy or widespread or longstanding practice or custom caused the deprivation of Mr. Byram's rights by the County of Los Angeles; that is, the County of Los Angeles' official policy or widespread or longstanding practice or custom is so closely related to the deprivation of Mr. Byram's rights as to be the moving force that caused the ultimate injury.

See Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions, No. 9.5 Section 1983 Claims Against Local Governing Body Defendants Based on Official Policy, Practice or Custom—Elements and Burden of Proof; *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.*, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

Claim 5: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM – Failure to Train

Elements:

- 1. The acts of Blake Runge deprived Mr. Byram of his constitutional right to be free from excessive force;
- 2. Blake Runge acted under color of state law;

1

4 5

6

- 7 8
- 9
- 11

12

10

13

15

14

16

17

18

20

19

2122

2324

25

2627

2728

- 3. The training policies of the County of Los Angeles, with respect to the use of deadly force, were not adequate to train its sheriff's deputies to handle the usual and recurring situations with which they must deal.
- 4. The County of Los Angeles was deliberately indifferent to the known or obvious consequences of its failure to train its deputies adequately with respect to the use of deadly force; and
- 5. The failure of the County of Los Angeles to provide adequate training with respect to deadly force caused Mr. Byram's injuries and/or death.

See Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions, No. 9.8, Section 1983 Claim Against Local Governing Body Defendants Based on a Failure to Train—Elements and Burden of Proof (2017) (revised December 2023); Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Claim 6: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM – Ratification

Elements:

- 1. Blake Runge acted under color of state law;
- 2. The acts of Blake Runge deprived Mr. Byram of his constitutional right to be free from excessive force;
- 3. A final policymaker for the County of Los Angeles acted under color of state law;
- 4. A final policymaker for the County of Los Angeles had final policymaking authority from defendant County of Los Angeles concerning the acts of Blake Runge; and
- 5. A final policymaker for the County of Los Angeles ratified Blake Runge's acts, that is, a final policymaker for the County of Los Angeles knew of and specifically made a deliberate choice to approve Blake Runge's acts

- 1	
1	and the basis for it.
2	See Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions, No. 9.7 Section 1983 Claim
3	Against Local Governing Body Defendants Based on Ratification—Elements and
4	Burden of Proof; <i>Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.</i> , 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
5	
6 7	<u>Claim 7</u> : AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (42 U.S.C. § 12132)
8	Elements:
9	1. Mr. Byram was a qualified individual with a disability;
10	2. Blake Runge and Los Angeles County excluded Mr. Byram from
11	participation in or denied Mr. Byram the benefits of Los Angeles County's
12	services, programs, or activities, or otherwise discriminated against Mr.
13	Byram; and
14	3. Such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of Mr.
15	Byram's disability.
16	Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F. 3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2017); Sheehan v. City &
17	Cnty. of San Fransisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev'd in part on other
18	grounds, City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
19	
20	Claim 8: BATTERY (Wrongful Death and Survival)
21	Elements:
22	1. Blake Runge used force against Mr. Byram;
23	2. Blake Runge used unreasonable force;
24	3. Mr. Byram did not consent to the use of force;
25	4. Mr. Byram was injured and/or killed; and
26	5. Blake Runge's use of unreasonable force was a substantial factor in causing
27	Mr. Byram's injury and/or death.
28	

1	See CACI 1305B, Battery by Peace Officer; Yount v. City of Sacramento, 43 Cal.
2	4th 885, 902 (2008); Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1102 n.6
3	(2004).
4	
5	Claim 9: NEGLIGENCE (Wrongful Death and Survival)
6	Elements:
7	1. Blake Runge was negligent;
8	2. Mr. Byram was injured and/or killed;
9	3. The negligence of Runge was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Byram's
10	injury and/or death.
11	See CACI 441, Negligent Use of Deadly Force by Peace Officer.
12	CI : 10 EALCE IMPRICONMENT
13	Claim 10: FALSE IMPRISONMENT
14	Elements:
15	1. Brenda Alcantara intentionally deprived Ursula Byram of her freedom of
16	movement;
17	2. The detention compelled Ursula Byram to stay or go somewhere for some
18	appreciable time, however short;
19	3. Ursula Byram did not knowingly or voluntarily consent;
20	4. Ursula Byram was actually harmed; and
21	5. Brendan Alcantara's conduct was a substantial factor in causing Ursula
22	Byram's harm.
23	See CACI 1400, No Arrest Involved – Essential Factual Elements.
24	Claim 11: VIOLATION OF THE BANE ACT (Cal. Civil Code § 52.1)
25	Elements:
26	1. Blake Runge acted under color of law;
27	
28	

- 2. Blake Runge intended to violate Mr. Byram's rights, which can be shown by a reckless disregard for his constitutional rights;
- 3. Mr. Byram was injured;
- 4. Blake Runge's conduct was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Byram's injuries and/or death.

See Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Reese, 2 F. 3d 870 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is not necessary for the defendants to have been 'thinking in constitutional or legal terms at the time of the incidents, because a reckless disregard for a person's constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights." 888 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2018).

- 1. **AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES** Defendants plan to pursue the following affirmative defenses:
 - a. Qualified Immunity.
 - b. Self Defense and Defense of Others.
 - 2. The elements required to establish Defendants' affirmative defenses are:
 - a. Qualified Immunity:
 - i. Whether the facts show that Defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right;
 - ii. If the alleged conduct is constitutionally impermissible, whether said right was "clearly established" by law at the time of the incident; and
 - iii. Whether a reasonable deputy could have believed his conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.
 - b. Self Defense and Defense of Others:

- i. Deputy Runge reasonably believed that the Decedent was going to harm himself, them and/or others; and
- ii. Deputy Runge used only the amount of force that was reasonably necessary to control the Decedent and protect himself and others.
- 3. The key evidence Defendants rely on for each affirmative defense is:
 - a. Defendants did not deprive the Decedent or Plaintiffs of their rights under the United States Constitution;
 - Defendants did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of the Decedent and/or Plaintiffs of which a reasonable deputy would have known; and
 - c. The Decedent did not have a clearly established right to not be subjected to use of force by the deputies after he resisted commands to drop his weapon and advanced toward the deputies.
 - d. The force used by Defendants was in response to Decedent's aggression and threatening conduct; and
 - e. The deputies ceased using force when the Decedent stopped resisting.

8. <u>REMAINING ISSUES:</u>

In view of the admitted facts and the elements required to establish the claims, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses, the following issues remain to be tried:

1. Whether the Defendant Blake Runge used excessive or unreasonable force;

- Whether Defendant Blake Runge was negligent in his use of force considering his pre-shooting tactics;
 - Whether Mr. Byram was comparatively negligent
- Whether the Defendant Officers conduct was malicious, oppressive, or in reckless disregard to the rights of Plaintiffs' rights;
- Whether Defendant Brenda Alcantara unreasonably detained Ursula
- Whether the County of Los Angeles maintained an unconstitutional custom or policy related to the use of force;
- Whether the County of Los Angeles failed to properly train Blake Runge regarding the use of deadly force;
- Whether the County of Los Angeles has a history of ratifying unconstitutional and unreasonable uses of force and ratified Blake Runge's use of
- Whether the County of Los Angeles' customs and failures contributed
 - Whether Mr. Byram was a "qualified individual" under the ADA;
- Whether the County of Los Angeles failed to properly train Blake Runge to respond and interact with individuals like Mr. Byram;
- The amount of punitive damages for which the individual Defendant
 - The amount of damages;

Defendant's Contentions:

24

25

26

27

28

In view of the admitted facts and the elements required to establish the claims and affirmative defenses, the following issues remain to be tried:

Whether the amount of force used by Deputy Runge was objectively 4. reasonable given the circumstances.

- 1 5. Whether Ursula Byram was unreasonably detained by Deputy 2 Alcantara.
 - 6. Whether Deputy Runge's actions interfered with Plaintiffs' familial relationship with their father.
 - 7. Whether Deputies Runge and Alcantara are immune from liability for Plaintiffs' claims.
 - 8. Whether Defendant County of Los Angeles is liable for Plaintiff's *Monell* claims.

9. <u>ALL DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE</u>

10. <u>ALL DISCLOSURES PURSUANT TO F. R. CIV. P 26(A)(3) HAVE BEEN MADE</u>:

The joint exhibit list of the parties has been filed under separate cover as required by L.R. 16-6.1. Counsel agrees that this is not the final joint exhibit list, and that counsel will file an Amended Joint Exhibit List as soon as practicable 10 days before the trial begins.

11. THE JOINT WITNESS LISTS OF THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT:

Only the witnesses identified in the lists will be permitted to testify (other than solely for impeachment). The parties do not foresee that they will present evidence by way of deposition testimony, other than for impeachment or record refresh. Therefore, deposition transcripts will not be lodged with the court as required by L.R. 32-1.

12. <u>LAW AND MOTION</u>:

The Parties filed their Joint Motions in Limine on December 10, 2024.

1	13. THE COURT HAS NOT ORDERED BIFURCATION OF ANY ISSUES		
2	AT THIS TIME		
3	Defendants respectfully request that this Court bifurcate the trial.		
4	Specifically, Defendants request that Plaintiffs' Monell Claim, Failure to Train		
5	Claim, and Ratification Claim against the County of Los Angeles be tried during		
6	the second phase of trial, assuming a jury finds the Deputy Defendants violated Mr.		
7	Byram's constitutional rights		
8	The Parties agree that liability and punitive damages should not be tried		
9	together.		
10			
11	14. <u>CONCLUSION</u> ,		
12	The foregoing admissions having been made by the parties, and the parties		
13	having specified the foregoing issues remaining to be litigated, this Final Pretrial		
14	Conference Order shall supersede the pleadings and govern the course of the trial		
15	of this cause, unless modified to prevent manifest injustice.		
16			
17			
18	IT IS SO ORDERED.		
19			
20	Dated:, 2024		
21	Honorable Karen L. Stevenson United States District Court		
22	Central District of California		
23			
24			
25	Approved as to form and content:		
26			
27			
28			
	PROPOSED] FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER		

1	1 DATED: December 10, 2024	LAW OFFICES OF DALE K. GALIPO
2	$2 \parallel$	s/ Cooper Alison-Mayne
3	3 I	Dale K. Galipo
4	1	Cooper Alison-Mayne Attorneys for Plaintiffs
5		
6	$\left\ \frac{1}{1} \right\ $ DATED: December 10, 2024 HU	RRELL CANTRALL LLP
7	II.	
8	$\mathbf{B}\mathbf{y}$	/s/Jordan S. Stern
9	Э	THOMAS C. HURRELL JORDAN S. STERN
10)	NICOLE G. ORTEGA Attorneys for Defendants, COUNTY OF
11	1	Attorneys for Defendants, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, BLAKE RUNGE and BRENDA ALCANTARA
12	2	
13	3	
14	4	
15	5	
16	5	
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
	[PROPOSED] FINAL P	22 RETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER